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Abstract: 
This paper examines to which extent Confucius and Adam Smith can be read as virtue-
ethicists. The goal of this paper is to show that, despite all differences, the concept of the “self” 
performs similarly in Smith and Master Kong. Although Confucius condemns the sole pursuit of 
self-interests, he still accepts that it is the interested self that cultivates itself and behaves according 
to the rites. Adam Smith highlights the value of virtues as an orientation for the individuals on how 
to develop their self-interest without harming others, ideally strengthening society. This paper shows 
that moral self-cultivation is important to both. In questions of philosophical anthropology and 
ethics, Master Kong and Adam Smith share many convictions. There are however two specific 
differences between them: First, each developed a social philosophy against a different social, 
political, and institutional background. Second, while ritual propriety and political leadership are 
important for Confucius, in Adam Smith, they are addenda. Nothing differentiates the leader from 
the “gentleman”. 
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For Confucius (551-479 BCE; also: Master Kong, Kongzi; 孔子), a petty person, “xiaoren” (
小人), is “the thief of virtues”, “the root of resentment”, and a “source of evil”. When people pursue 
(solely) self-interest, they leave the path of moral self-cultivation and virtue. The enlightened “junzi” 
(君子) is a self-cultivated person following a code of behavior determined by benevolence (rén, 仁) 
and ritual (lǐ, 禮), fulfilling one or different roles in society. Adam Smith (1723-1790), on the other 
hand, has a much more sympathetic view of self-interest. This is because he associates virtues with 
self-interest and differentiates between self-interest and selfishness. In “The Wealth of Nations” 
(WN, 1776) and “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (TMS, 1759), he argues for a specific sort of 
self-interest that, in association with other “moral sentiments”, makes people willing to follow higher 
ethical standards. At first sight, Confucius and Adam Smith seem to be irreconcilable. 
However, this paper explores the similarities in the thoughts of Confucius and Smith. It 
focuses on the idea of the “self” as an element in both philosophers’ ethics, pointing out that the self 
performs similar functions in their respective thought. This reading is based on an understanding of 
Master Kong and Smith as virtue-ethicists. On the other hand, this reading identifies an important 
differentiator between Master Kong and Smith, even if both are understood as virtue-ethicists: 
ritual. 
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The goal of this paper is to uncover similarities in the function of the “self” against all the 
differences between Master Kong and Smith. Exploring these similarities is important, because it 
shows, on the one hand, that Smith’s self is not egoistical if nurtured in a proper way and, on the 
other hand, that Kong’s self is interested in itself, too. In both philosophies, the self performs a 
practical and epistemic function. Thus far, this aspect has been under-valued in the comparison of 
these philosophers. This paper will conclude by showing that while Smith’s “gentleman” is not a 
Confucian “junzi”, the concept is still very far away from a “xiaoren”.  
This paper will begin characterizing Confucius’ philosophy, will then describe Adam Smith’s, 
and will finally conclude by elaborating what unites them but also what the specific differences 
between both philosophers are. This paper will go back to the texts of Adam Smith and the Analects 
attributed to Master Kong. 
 
Virtue and Self-interest in Confucius 
Confucius was more than a philosopher; he was also a statesman. His philosophy envisaged 
unifying ethics, actions, and statecraft in a holistic body. If people cultivate their selves, they will 
develop virtuosity that will enable them to perform their roles in society and will lead to a good 
society. The idea of leading a good life and creating a good society is essential to Confucius. His aim 
was to overcome the chaos of his time and to restore order (Li 2013). 
Confucius was a social reformer. This becomes more understandable against the background 
of his time: the Chinese states were in a dire situation, wars were the norm, hunger was not 
uncommon, clannism, corruption, self-indulging rulers and ministers lost in selfishness and palace 
intrigues were day-to-day situations. Many different ideas of social reform emerged in this context. 
Some wanted a more spiritual life, others detachment from that saddening reality, yet other groups 
concentrated on realism for reforming statecraft. Master Kong took a different way (Chin 2007). 
Confucius believed that the basis for reform of the state(s) and of society lay in the ancient 
times of Zhou (1050-771 BCE), in its virtues and rituals. He interpreted the former not as religious 
or esoteric sacrifices, asking for the blessings of spirits, but as ceremonies performed by human agents 
and embodying the civilized and cultured patterns of behavior developed through generations of 
human wisdom. For him, they embodied the ethical core of (Chinese) society. Moreover, Confucius 
applied the term ritual to actions beyond the formal sacrifices and religious ceremonies to include 
social rituals: courtesies and accepted standards of behavior. At the same time, he did not want 
people just to perform rituals. He stressed the character of the person’s motivation: In order to be 
fully virtuous, a person must follow the rituals for the right reasons, from an understanding and 
acceptance of how they contribute to human flourishing. Master Kong’s reform goal was bottom-
up. By reforming people, especially the ruling elite, Kong wanted to reform society and the state (see 
also Wilson 2002). 
How do virtues and rites interrelate? In the Analects, there is no definite catalogue of virtues. 
From the onset, it is evident that Master Kong prefers benevolence, integrity, righteousness, filial 
piety, and the rituals as such, with a virtue relating to them, ritual propriety. Much later, in Han (206 
BC - 220), institutional Confucianism systemized the wǔ cháng – sì zì (五常- 四字, five constants, 
four elements). The five constants are rén (仁, benevolence, humaneness), yì (義, righteousness or 
justice), lǐ (禮, ritual propriety), zhì (智, knowledge), and xìn (信, integrity). And the four elements 
are zhōng (忠, loyalty), xiào (孝, filial piety), jié (節, contingency), and yì (義, righteousness). There 
are still many other elements, such as chéng (誠, honesty), shù (恕, kindness and forgiveness), lián (
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廉, honesty and cleanness), chǐ (恥, shame, judgement and sense of right and wrong), yǒng (勇, 
bravery), wēn (溫, kind and gentle), liáng (良, good, kindhearted), gōng (恭, respectful, reverent), 
jiǎn (儉, frugal), and ràng (讓, modestly, self-effacing) (see Hu 1929). The rites transform people 
into good members of society (Eno 1990), members who know how to behave and how to play a 
respective role. Li (2007) calls the rites a “common grammar for everyday situations”. 
While this system might not be original to the Analects, the virtues enumerated above are all 
present in Master Kong’s teachings. Even if they are not systematized by the Master in such a way, 
the Han-era list, according to Eno (1990) and Li (2007), depicts what is important to Confucius 
and, at the same time, revolutionary in his philosophy. These character traits, or virtues, are not 
exclusive to some people, neither are they natural to all humans. Rather, they have to be discovered 
and nurtured by each person. The cultivation of these virtues strengthens the moral character of a 
person. By expanding the possibility of moral self-cultivation to all, Kong is at the same time claiming 
that virtues, rites, and roles are not the privilege of the elite. 
By stressing that the ancient sage-kings were “normal” people, Confucius asserts three factors. 
First, he does not dismiss the possibility of self-cultivation being open to all people. Second, he makes 
a strong claim about human nature. Because the ancient sages were “normal” people, because they 
succeeded in self-cultivation, and because they should be emulated, what follows is that all people 
share the predisposition of moral self-cultivation. And third, Confucius admits that his concepts of 
human nature and the morally self-cultivated being are tied to a thick understanding of human 
nature itself. The sage-kings of the past are not only examples to emulate but also represent human 
nature. 
As the Analects state in IV, 23, “Virtue is not left to stand alone. He who practices it will have 
neighbors”, i.e. virtue is by definition a relational propriety and belongs therefore to the realm of 
acting in society. People are never detached from society, according to the philosophy of Confucius, 
and that is why the roles are important. Cultivating the virtues and rituals are not only central 
because they turn people into civilized people but especially because they enable people to perform 
their respective roles in society. There are five typical role-pairs: ruler to ruled, father to son, husband 
to wife, elder brother to younger brother, friend to friend. Specific duties are applicable to each of 
the participants in these sets of relationships and the characteristics of these relationships can be 
expanded by analogy to practically all types of social interactions (Hwang 2000). Virtues and rites 
enable people to be role-bearers and act ethically. 
Hansen (2000) explains the broad context of person, virtue, role, and the cultivation of the 
self, “To Confucius, an isolated individual means that some disaster has occurred; the natural, 
healthy state of humans is in social structures (60).” And what is a social structure? “Society consists 
of a ritual structure, of a system of roles. Society is the sum of its roles not the sum of its individuals 
(62).” Performing the roles leads to having and gaining merit. But merit is not completely or mainly 
a given, it is something that has to be developed by the “junzi”. “He (Confucius) stressed that we 
appoint by merit based on ‘de’. Merit does run in families but is presumably the result of nurture 
not nature (63).” Moral self-cultivation has, therefore, two dimensions. First, it is the internal-sided 
development of rationality and sentiments. And second, this development always happens in the 
context of the roles one plays in society. 
In short, virtues are the necessary but not sufficient intensional aspect of behavior. Following 
the rites (out of good motives, which in turn, is a virtue) is also necessary but not sufficient 
extensional aspect. Both come together and are made complete in the sufficient aspect of Confucian 
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philosophy, which is performing the role(s) that is partly socially, partly naturally, and partly 
context-dependently bestowed upon the self. The cultivation of the self brings these aspects into 
balance. Of course, this characterization only applies to the intensional and extensional aspects of 
morality. Master Kong, since he was also developing a practical philosophy, also regarded other 
necessary aspects such as education, abilities, knowledge – which fall outside the scope of this paper 
– that focus on the investigation of the ethical part of the argument. All these aspects are brought 
together by self-cultivation. 
What is, now, the basic difference between the “junzi” and the “xiaoren”? In the Analects, 
Master Kong presents different juxtapositions of them; for example: “While the “junzi” cherishes 
respect for the law, the small man cherishes generous treatment (IV. 11).” “The “junzi” understands 
what is moral. The small man understands what is profitable (IV. 16).” “The “junzi” is easy of mind, 
while the small man is always full of anxiety (VII. 91).” “The “junzi” helps others to realize what is 
good in them; he does not help them to realize what is bad in them. The small man does the opposite 
(XII. 16).” “The “junzi” agrees with others without being an echo. The small man echoes without 
being in agreement (XIII. 23).” “The “junzi” is at ease without being arrogant; the small man is 
arrogant without being at ease (XII 26).” “The “junzi” gets through to what is up above; the small 
man gets through to what is down below (XIV. 128).” “What a “junzi” seeks, he seeks within himself; 
what a small man seeks, he seeks in others (XV.21).” 
These thoughts not only denote that the “junzi” and the “xiaoren” are fundamentally 
different; they also show how each is preoccupied with different aspects. While the “junzi” has the 
action, with its outcomes and its motivations in mind, the “xiaoren” only cares about the outcomes 
that are directly pertinent to him or her. The “junzi” has more developed rational capabilities – the 
“junzi” questions others, seeks and has knowledge, is self-critical –, cultivates sentiments – the 
“junzi” is calm, harmonious, respectful –, and is capable of acting on the grounds of this 
combination of rationality and sentiments. The “xiaoren”, on the other hand, is neither fully rational 
(at least in a sense of objective rationality understood as pursuing what in desirable in the long term) 
nor has developed sentiments. Therefore, the “xiaoren” acts not on the basis of a framework of 
reference but on basal instincts directed at envisaging specific outcomes. 
While petty people understand the world only in relation to their own wants and needs (i.e. 
they are self-centered), the “junzi” understands his role in a set of social interrelations. While the only 
question that the “xiaoren” are capable of asking is “how will this affect me”, the “junzi” possess both 
the desire and the ability to see the entire context in which they are situated. The “junzi” can see a 
community, a family, a state as a living organism with multiple, conflicting, and equally valid wants 
and needs. The great strength of the “junzi” is the ability to make decisions for the sake of the entire 
social organism. For this reason, “junzi” should lead others (Kim 2009). 
Chow (2011) thinks that while the “xiaoren” are the common people, i.e. the masses, the 
“junzi” are the leaders (implying that they necessarily come out of nobility). Chow comes very close 
to saying that these elite are a stratum of society set apart from society. This might be the closest 
reading of the “junzi” in the Analects. There might be two reasons explaining this idea in the 
Analects. First, since Kong was writing as a statesman, he was targeting statesmen of his time. He 
wanted to show them what a person in the public realm has to do in order to become an 
extraordinary leader. Second and more philosophically, while everyone can become virtuous, can 
follow the rites, and can perform roles, Confucius wanted to make it clear that becoming a “junzi” 
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is a necessary moral goal for every member of the nobility, since only the “junzi” would be able to 
lead the community and the public affairs. 
So, the virtuous and especially the “junzi” are those who know how to behave in society, i.e. 
what roles to play and how to play them. Virtuous people and the “junzi” decide which course of 
action to take in regard to the roles involved in the making of a decision and the effects the decision 
has. Furthermore, the virtuous and the “junzi” nurture those feelings and virtues that make it more 
possible for them to play the roles they have – but not only that, they also acquire their education, 
abilities, and knowledge while keeping their roles in mind. Because the virtuous and the “junzi” not 
only see beyond their self-interest but primarily focus on roles in society, the virtuous and especially 
the “junzi” are exemplary and able to lead (Ivanhoe 2000). 
Does this all entail that the virtuous and the “junzi” have no self-interest? Master Kong 
despises those that act selfishly and out of self-interest alone. However, Confucius acknowledges the 
worth of the self. In Analects II, 12, he states, “The junzi is not a utensil.” This can be read as the 
“junzi” never being a means to an end but a presence, a person, something bearing self-worth. This 
presence has intrinsic worth, and this value is not only valid because of the role but because the 
“junzi” as such is able to perform his role. As such, the “junzi” knows of his worth. The “junzi” has 
an interest in progressing towards an ethically complete person. However, this implies some self-
interest on the side of the “junzi”. In addition, people having specific characters, and character being 
something different from a role, is also acknowledged in Analects II, 10: “See what a man does. Mark 
his motives. Examine in what things he rests. How can a man conceal his character? How can a man 
conceal his character?” 
The motives individuals have when acting are important in Kong’s thinking. He does not 
want plain adherence to the rites. He does not want plain performance. He wants the person to 
think, examine the world, and adhere to the role this person is supposed to play, concluding that it 
is the right thing to do. Master Kong wants good performance for the right reasons. This process 
that goes beyond just doing what one is supposed to do relies on self-interest interpreted as the 
interested self, thinking about her or his own motives to act. The self that is interested in analyzing 
her or his own virtues, role-performance, and character is a self-interested self; a self that has interest 
in the self. Confucius seems to presuppose this epistemic version of self-interest, since without an 
interest in the self, the self cannot cultivate the self. 
Confucian self-interest might go even further. In Analects IV, 12, it says, “He who acts with a 
constant view to his own advantage will be much murmured against.” The problem here does not 
seem to be the person acting out of self-interest but only out of selfishness. The person that is 
interested in the self does not necessarily consider the self the only or central focus of attention. On 
the contrary, a critical reflection of the self is a facet of self-interest. The self-cultivating person must 
have an interest in the self. Contrast this with the selfish person, who only is interested in the self and 
only acts because of the self. The effect is not even that pure selfishness is per se blameworthy but 
that the relational conditions of the agent will be affected and will affect him or her negatively. In 
fact, this saying is an appeal to the self-interest of agents not to act selfishly, because selfishness is 
detrimental to the long-run self-interests of the agent. Similarly, the Confucian virtuous and the 
“junzi” are not other-worldly entities but have a fully developed psychology, including needs, 
pleasures, and sadness. In Analects VI, 23, Master Kong is clear about the wise and virtuous pursuing 
their self-interest: The Master said, “The wise find pleasure in water; the virtuous find pleasure in 
hills. The wise are active; the virtuous are tranquil. The wise are joyful; the virtuous are long-lived.”  
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In Master Kong’s thinking, through self-cultivation, all – or at least most – people could 
become virtuous and some even “junzi”. The interested self could even be the argument that allows 
him or her to be optimistic. If all, the “junzi”, virtuous people and the “xiaoren” share some sort of 
self-interest, what differentiates them is the horizon of self-interest. The self-interest of the “xiaoren” 
is directed only to attaining objects for the self without any recognition of a necessary relation of the 
self to other selves. Master Kong, however, thinks that the roles people have to play might provide 
objective guidance, including to the “xiaoren”. The virtuous or the “junzi” could argue with the 
“xiaoren” that reducing self-interest to egoism makes the self worse off. Instead, extending self-
interest to include the necessary relation of the self to the community would make the self better off. 
In this case, it would be in the interest of the self to expand the horizons of self-interest. Recognizing 
the error of egoism is in the self-interest of the person. 
In summary, Kong’s philosophy wanted to reform society by reforming people first. It was 
based on virtues and ritual propriety, because the first enables an ethical mindset and the second 
makes it possible to behave ethically. Both – and all virtues – join the inner aspect, motivation, with 
the outer aspect, action. They – together with a person’s education, abilities, and knowledge – enable 
people to perform roles in a community. All these aspects must be nurtured through self-cultivation. 
Those who succeed in the cultivation of their selves, the virtuous and the “junzi”, can also lead 
people. Self-cultivation, however, does not entail the negation of the self. Quite the contrary. The 
self-that self-cultivates needs at least an epistemic self-interest. So, it is possible to reconcile virtues, 
rites, roles, and self-cultivation with the advancement of self-interested goals. 
 
Virtue and Self-Interest in Adam Smith 
Adam Smith, too, was a social reformer. His definition of the good life has three components, 
the eradication of poverty, moral cultivation of the self, and social immersion of the self. Like Master 
Kong, Smith never separated people from the organization of society. But unlike the Chinese 
Master, Smith embraced the advantages of his commercial, proto-industrial time using some of its 
merits as groundwork of political, social, and ethic philosophy. One of the merits on which he relies 
is the virtues, which he sees as constitutive in such a “merchant society” (Muller 1993). 
In the TMS, Smith states that the “gentleman” acts according to the “rules of perfect 
prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence” (TMS, X, 1). This formulation seems 
convoluted. Smith seems to appeal to a rule. Yet he does not. In the length of the TMS and the WN, 
it becomes clear that, for Smith, it is the virtues of prudence, justice, and love as well as courage and 
temperance that are essential to the “gentleman”. Virtues are crucial for Smith’s ethics and 
philosophy of action, since he believed that people behave on character traits and depending on the 
context. The context, albeit a given, has a constitutive and normative character. Behaving in a certain 
context does not mean that the agent self judges the context alone but calculates how a particular 
course of action might meet approval or disapproval from peers. The agent self, through prudence, 
strikes a balance between interests and alternate courses of action. This will be developed in this 
section. 
Smith establishes that acting on virtues has an internal and external component. The internal 
component is discussed when Smith elaborates the virtue of prudence – “the character of the 
individual in its bearing on his own happiness” – in the TMS (VI, 1) and in the entire WN. It is not 
that only prudence has an internal component, but Smith chooses it for clarifying how this 
component works. According to him, there are three different mechanisms at the same time. First, 
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the interest of the concerned person, be this an interest for the self, for the immediate relatives, or 
for the other person. Second, there is a set of moral sentiments telling people what to do under a 
certain circumstance. And third, there is the “impartial spectator”, which will be discussed below. 
Furthermore, when Smith refers to the individual, he also means the social context of that individual, 
especially her or his family and friendships. 
The external component is regarded when he inquiries about benevolence – “the character of 
the individual in its bearing on the happiness of other people” – in the TMS, VI, 2, which he takes 
to comprise the virtues of justice and love, or what he calls “beneficence”. Benevolence, for Smith, is 
a virtue that enables the self to develop empathy – in his words: sympathy – towards other selves and 
recognize that they all belong to the same community. Being benevolent, in Smith’s terms, is asking 
how one impacts other people’s life and the community’s life. While benevolence, as a virtue, 
addresses the internal, intensional aspect for dealing with external, extensional side, Smith develops 
the “impartial spectator”. It makes consequences of one’s action clear. In a relationship, if there are 
intensional virtues and an extensional “impartial spectator”, then self-command is what brings them 
together in human action (TMS VI, 3). Self-command itself requires the acting self to use the virtues 
of prudence and benevolence (love and justice) as well as the virtues of temperance and courage. In 
a conclusion of that part of the TMS (VI, 4), Smith states: “Concern for our own happiness 
recommends to us the virtue of (1) prudence; concern for the happiness of other people 
recommends to us the virtues of (2) justice, which restrains us from harming their happiness, and (3) 
beneficence, which prompts us to promote it.” 
Smith begins to stress the impartiality of the spectator only when he comes to theorize about 
the effect of the reactions of spectators on the agent. Smith’s spectator is first called impartial in the 
chapter that distinguishes between the amiable and the respectable virtues, the virtues of humanity 
on the one hand, and self-command on the other. Humanity is a more-than-average degree of 
sympathetic feeling and is the result of an effort by the spectator to heighten his or her sympathy in 
order to match the experience of the person principally concerned. Self-command is conversely a 
virtue of the “person principally concerned” and is the result of an endeavor to restrain natural 
emotion and to lower its pitch to that which the ordinary spectator feels through sympathy. 
Empathy, or sympathy, keeps people in their own orbit and in harmony with others (general 
theory of morality paralleling Newton’s general theory of physics). Sympathy occurs through the 
objective part of man that Smith calls the impartial spectator. Sympathy is an emotion, a moral 
sentiment, that is made objective, or at least intersubjective, by the impartial spectator and by 
rationality. Whereas one person can judge one agent, how is the person to account for his/her own 
action? The agent has to “divide” himself into two: an agent in its proper sense and a supposed 
spectator, which is called impartial, since it is the self-judging part. Impartiality, however, does not 
rule out sympathy. It is indeed sympathy that allows us to judge as an impartial spectator, since this 
is a common feature of all members of the community. By using the impartial spectator to examine 
one’s own and others’ actions, a person separates him or herself into two: the examiner and the 
examined. 
The impartial spectator is the operationalization of the moral “senses” of approval and 
disapproval. The topic of sympathy is brought up in the TMS I, 1. Sympathy is an aspect of the 
“sense” of propriety, and propriety entails how to properly behave. Behaving properly means 
behaving in such a way that meets approval from one’s peer; and therefore, behaving improperly 
meets with disapproval. In the TMS II, 1, Smith discusses that sympathy is related to the senses of 
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approval and disapproval, but it is not the same thing as these senses. In fact, approval and 
disapproval are reflections upon and judgments about the level of sympathy people feel with one 
another. Sympathy and propriety stand therefore as a double link to each other. In the WN, Smith 
returns to this relationship, treating it as a series of balances in judgement. These balances are guided 
by the virtue of “prudence”. 
For Smith, being a “gentleman” is acting properly in a social context. It might be an 
overstatement claiming that the Smithian self is essentially a relational self, but the self surely is 
always in a social context. This context is not defined by roles, as in Master Kong’s approach, but by 
relationships of empathy. Behaving as a “gentleman” essentially means taking society seriously and 
measuring one’s actions by the social effects of that action and by the degree of approval or 
disapproval by the peers of the acting self. How, then, can the acting self be a self-interested agent? 
The simplest answer, in a Smithian sense, is: being a “gentleman” depends on how the person handles 
self-interest. 
In “The Wealth of Nations”, there is a famous quote in which self-interest is pictured as the 
center of one’s action. “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages (WN, I, 2, 2).” How can this idea be interpreted in the light of what was said above? 
Note first, that the claim is not normative but descriptive. Smith is not saying that agents 
should or have to act self-interestedly but only saying that, in that particular context, the agents 
pursue self-interest. Second, there is no claim that economic agents act purely based on their self-
love. They are self-interested but not selfish. It is quite the contrary. In the cases exemplified in the 
quote above, all parties are interested in exchange, because exchange corresponds to the way to act 
in that specific context and is met by approval by all participating. Third, Smith is making a point 
about the necessary conditions for market exchanges to take place; after all, it is the chapter 
addressing the division of labor. Among these conditions there is the self-interested nature of a baker 
in being a baker and not a butcher. Self-interest here refers to “the self” being interested in her or his 
own interests or talents in order to find out which profession one wants to take up. The discussion 
about profession and talents takes place in the exact same chapter (WN, I, 2, 5). Much as Master 
Kong discusses the education, abilities, and knowledge of agents – not always in the moral context 
but guided by moral self-cultivation – Smith discusses the same here but let it be guided by self-
command and the impartial spectator, too. 
The WN is an application of the virtue of prudence; even the self-interest depicted above is 
not free from other applications of that same virtue. There is the self-interest of the baker to produce 
and sell bakeware and not to give them away. But why? It is not only out of selfishness but also in 
regard to other duties the baker has to perform such as caring for his family and paying taxes (WN, 
IV, 2). After all, the baker acts prudently; part of this prudence is to provide for others and for oneself 
in order to be able to play an active role in society. Taking care of one’s self, one’s family, but also 
one’s duty towards other institutions are tasks that demand prudence.  
Because of this, there is an even wider-ranging concern in the WN. The claim of self-interest 
goes as far as to say that every person is worth something and that it is legitimate to see one’s life not 
just as a means to an end. Self-interest enables the person to think for her and himself and not just to 
subordinate under the commands of landowners, aristocracy, or the church. Smith was writing for 
merchants, but he didn’t even want their servants to be subordinates, but rather to show self-interest 
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and self-command. This also explains why Adam Smith devoted several chapters of the WN (e.g. III; 
IV, 3; IV, 5) to inquiring about inequality, thinking that free exchange decreases inequality between 
people. 
The WN also serves to lay out the design of an ideal society (WN IV). This is shaped by free 
exchanges in free markets because of two reasons. First, markets contribute in eradicating poverty, 
and poverty is a massive impediment in the establishment of an ethical society. Second, free exchange 
in free markets is an important equalizer. It is in this freedom that every person can act prudently 
and benevolently if in possession of sufficient self-command. And so, self-interest for Adam Smith 
is, in its positive sense, always a function of prudence and always applied in combination with 
benevolence guided by self-command. Prudence, on the other hand, resembles Kong’s virtues of 
filial piety and justice as well as his preference for partial care of one’s own family. On the other hand, 
Smithian goes beyond the reading proposed above of Confucius by taking self-interest as an 
epistemic criterion. For Smith, self-interest – not selfishness – is part of at least one virtue. 
How, then, can one be sure that the self-interested person acting on the virtue of prudence 
does not degenerate and become an egoist? In this reading, Smith’s answer is twofold. First, one does 
not act on one virtue alone. It is always prudence, justice, love, courage, and temperance that belong 
to the strength of character of the person, and a constant cultivation of these is necessary. The second 
answer is that performing one’s actions is always a relational matter. One’s actions must be seen in 
the context of itself, its motivations, and its outcomes, including its impacts on society. 
In “The Wealth of Nations”, Smith is clear that any exchange, even one guided by prudence, 
needs an institutional setting as well as trust. Trust, on the other hand, develops on the basis of 
empathic mindsets, and those are by necessary relational terms. And even the appeal to the self-
interest of the economic agent is a relational contention. Smith thinks that no society can be 
flourishing, moral, and happy when the greater parts of its members are poor and miserable. In order 
to escape poverty, members of society are urged to find out what they can do better than others, and 
the epistemic tool by which they find it out is self-interest. So, self-interest is an epistemic postulate 
and not a moral norm for Adam Smith. The epistemic postulate serves in finding out a place in the 
economic value chain or, to put it in Confucian terms, a role. The moral dimensions of acting 
according to virtues and the impartial spectator turn the self-interested person into a moral being, a 
gentleman. For Smith, there is no market and no society without social empathy. In the TMS, he 
states: “No matter how selfish you think man is, it’s obvious that there are some principles in his 
nature that give him an interest in the welfare of others, and make their happiness necessary to him, 
even if he gets nothing from it but the pleasure of seeing it (I, 1, 1).” 
It seems that Adam Smith knows that the self-interested individual, even if guided by a self-
interested virtue, like prudence, is still incomplete. While self-interest is prudence’s pre-requisite, it 
alone cannot guide the actions of people. Surely, according to the TMS, prudence establishes that 
an individual upholds certain relationships, is trustworthy, loyal, and even filial. But on the other 
hand, the individual does not transcend the self when acting purely on prudence. The “gentleman” 
knows how to act on prudence combined with love and justice intermediated by self-command, 
which is the combination of courage and temperance. He or she knows that not only because she or 
he has some moral inclinations of doing so, but because she or he learned how to act on the virtues 
by self-control. Self-control is the constant nurturing of the virtues in which a “gentleman” has to 
act. 
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In summary, Smith’s philosophy is based on five virtues: prudence, love, justice (these two 
grouped in benevolence), temperance, and courage (these two grouped in self-command). These 
virtues are not valid on their own. They also have a relational character, since every action has an 
inner aspect shaped by virtues and an outer aspect shaped and measured by the “impartial spectator”. 
If people do not necessarily play roles, they always interact in society. The Smithian self is interested 
in her or himself, but the “gentleman” maintains this interest as epistemic guidance. Smithian self-
interest encompasses caring for one’s family and friends and is meant also as a motivator for equality. 
So are many of the institutions he had in mind, geared at making it possible for people to interact as 
equals. Self-command is the way people reconcile the virtues they act upon with society and the 
“impartial spectator”. Self-command needs a constant cultivation of the self. The “gentleman” is the 
person that masters self-command and, therefore, combines virtues in social relations. 
 
The Self and the Virtuous 
This last section discusses the similarities and differences between both philosophers. It will 
establish that while the Smithian “gentleman” is no Confucian “junzi” – lacking ritual propriety and 
the moral task to lead other people – the “gentleman” isn’t automatically a “xiaoren” either. The 
Smithian gentleman can be Confucian “virtuous”. In both cases, it is a question of how to nurture 
the interested self. 
It is easy to recollect what unites both philosophers: In Adam Smith, as well as in Confucius, 
there are moral agents acting on virtues and always in a relational – social – context. These moral 
agents strive (or should strive) to become “gentlemen”, or “virtuous”, or “junzi” through self-
command or self-cultivation. These agents are not only moral agents. They have other resources, 
too, for example education, abilities, and knowledge – but these practical resources also have to be 
nurtured and managed by self-cultivation and self-command. In both philosophies, the ideal society 
can only be achieved if a reasonable amount of people strive and succeed in becoming “gentlemen”, 
or “virtuous”, or “junzi”. In Smith’s case, this ideal society is economically prosperous; in Kong, it is 
a well-ordered state. This different focus is influenced by the particular problems each’s society was 
facing. Smith wanted to eradicate poverty in a novel type of society, and Master Kong wanted to 
institute order modeled on past experience. 
In Adam Smith, as well as in Confucius, self-interest and the virtues play an important role, 
albeit not the same. The Smithian “gentleman” needs to be self-interested in order to act on the virtue 
of prudence. However, the “gentleman” needs to act on justice and love, too, which is achieved by 
using the “impartial spectator”. Training one’s self in acting on prudence as well as on benevolence 
– guided by self-command – is also part of the Smithian program. For Confucius, on the other hand, 
virtues, rites, and roles define the moral actions of the self. The “virtuous” and the “junzi” cultivate 
their own self in order to be able to play their roles. However, with the “virtuous” and the “junzi” 
having to cultivate the self, an interested self is presupposed. This interested self has the self-interest 
necessary to recognize the virtues and relationships and act on them. In particular, it has enough 
interest in the self to cultivate it. In Adam Smith, the self-interested agent is a given. Self-interest, if 
guided by the virtues, enables the self to recognize what to do but also, and even more importantly, 
the social desiderata of the self’s action. In Confucius, the role of self-interest is a different one. It is 
primarily an epistemic criterion by which the self discerns how to self-cultivate. 
There are however important differences between Adam Smith and Master Kong. These 
differences occur at several different levels. 
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The first is the level of virtue itself. Adam Smith has a conception of virtue grounded in a 
general notion of human nature that focuses on aspects of human psychology. His conception 
describes the virtues in terms of dispositions conducive to smooth, agreeable, and beneficial 
interactions between individuals within and between different societies. In his view, virtue-ethics is 
the exploration of general emotional resources, tendencies, and capacities. Master Kong, on the other 
hand, has a different conception of virtue. It is grounded in a comprehensive and detailed notion of 
human nature that seeks to describe the content, structure, and overall shape of human nature. It is 
developed in terms of a teleological view about the cultivation of human nature expressed in an ideal 
or paradigmatic model of what it is to be human, specifically, modeled against the background of 
the sage-kings. Confucius – and Confucianism generally – seeks to provide an account of human 
nature that describes its content, structure, and shape. Virtues are part of this account – together 
with roles, rites, knowledge, etc. One consequence of this difference is that for Smith the virtues are 
more expressions of features of human psychology within the confines of particular social 
conditions. For example, instead of describing and holding up the man of practical wisdom as the 
ideal standard for the good and the aim of every human life, Smith describes what people must be 
like in order to form and maintain a humane and cooperative society and interact with other societies 
around the world in an agreeable and beneficial manner. For Smith, the virtues are practical 
expressions of what is needed to live well in particular social conditions; human nature serves as a 
resource for crafting the best kind of life. Confucius’ idea has a firm but general psychological 
foundation, not a specific trajectory or goal. Confucius idea of virtue is not context-sensitive, but 
generally valid and if dependent on anything, then on the role a person performs. 
The second level is about how widespread virtue is. While both philosophers seem to abhor 
ruffians and the “xiaoren”, they do so for distinct reasons. Adam Smith believes that those ruffians 
have the epistemic capabilities associated with self-interest and can even acknowledge virtue; 
however, they do not act on it. Kong, on the other hand, seems to think that the “xiaoren” lack the 
epistemic capabilities as well as virtues, since they act on instincts. Later, Confucians then expand 
the Master’s view and accept that proper education and even acting on instincts could develop the 
necessary capabilities to attain merit (Kim 2004). 
The third difference is in the way the interested self uses self-interest. The Smithian 
“gentleman” has a solid sense of society. At all times, however, the “gentleman” has his own interests 
in mind, too. Even when putting society first, the “gentleman” is acting on his own interest, since 
putting society first means seeking the approval of the self’s actions by society. The Confucian 
“virtuous” and the “junzi”, on the other hand, use self-interest in order to comply with the rites and 
understand virtues as well as to act on them. The status of self-interest is thus different. For Smith, 
it is an epistemic category that permeates the virtue of prudence. For Master Kong, it is just the 
epistemic category. 
Fourth, there are also differences between Master Kong and Adam Smith on the extensional 
aspects of action. For Confucius, the rites are essential for performing roles. The relationship of 
virtues, rites, and roles seems to create an objective framework on how people should act. In Smith’s 
thought, however, there does not seem to be such a framework. Guided by virtues and the impartial 
spectator, the self devises courses of action and acts, but all these seem to be contingent on the 
specific context and the specific social desiderata associated with the context. In the TMS, Smith 
acknowledges the importance of etiquette. However, for him, etiquette is not ethically constitutive 
of the “gentleman”. In Master Kong, ritual propriety means more than just adhering to etiquette. It 
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means attaching ethical value to it. The “junzi” is always rén (仁) and lǐ (禮), because the roles 
themselves are shared ritual performances. This dimension is absent in Adam Smith. 
Fifth, the Smithian gentleman has no necessary political role to play. When engaged in the 
public sphere, the gentleman will use the same virtues and self-command that allow him to be 
successful and ethical in other transactions. There is no special “calling” for public agency associated 
with the “gentleman”. In fact, that itself is part of the novel social model sponsored by Smith: the 
same “gentleman” that is successful and ethical in other exchanges can engage in politics. Smith’s is 
a bourgeois social model. Master Kong, on the other hand, associated a special calling to the “junzi”: 
the “junzi” was called to lead through superior ethics. This is also absent in Smith. 
In addition to these discussions and on a different level, two further similarities of Smith and 
Confucius arise – but these similarities impose problems. Both seem to think that all members of 
society share the same values. Furthermore, both might presuppose that all agents share the same 
epistemic structures. In the Confucian case, these two (hidden) assumptions might be, after all, 
plausible. Since Kong accepted the natural structure of the dào (way, 道), the “tiān” (heaven, 天), 
and the order of things, what follows logically is that this natural order transposes to the social order 
and to the structures of thought of agents. For Smith, the situation is more difficult, since he does 
not seem to make an explicit commitment towards a natural order or a metaphysical grounding. 
In reality, there are two groups of problems with Adam Smith’s theory of virtue. The first is: 
Smith refers to two principles that he deems necessary conditions for human society. He presupposes 
that all members of the community share the same values. Also, he equally presupposes that they 
train themselves to adhere to these values, i.e. he imagines all members of society cultivating common 
values. The argument in which morality is a means of self-control rests largely on Smith’s notion of 
self-command as an essential precondition for human society. 
To the first problem in more detail: Smith believes that to judge whether a motive or feeling 
is warranted or proper, we must take up, not some external perspective, but that of the person who 
has the motive or feeling – the agent’s standpoint, in the case of motivation; the patient’s standpoint, 
in the case of feeling (TMS, 16-23). Of course, Smith does believe that impartiality regulates moral 
judgment. However, it does so by disciplining the way in which we enter into the agent’s or patient’s 
point of view, not by providing its own perspective. Moral judgment involves an impartial 
projection into the agent’s or patient’s standpoint. “We imaginatively project, not us ourselves, but 
impartially, any one of us (TMS, 82, 137-38)”. The judgment that the agent’s motive or the patient’s 
feeling is proper involves what Smith calls “sympathy”: an imaginative sharing of the agent’s motive 
or the patient’s feeling from his point of view (TMS, i). Thus, Smith’s view makes all moral judgment 
deeply and individually related – either agent-relative or patient-relative or both (as in the case of 
justice). When one judges an agent’s motive, one does so from the agent’s own perspective 
(appropriately regulated), viewing the practical situation as one imagines it to confront him or her 
in deliberation. And when one judges someone’s feeling or reaction, one does so from a patient-
relative point of view, viewing the situation as one imagines it to confront the patient who responds 
to it. 
And to the second problem in more detail: Smith considers social harmony not just to be a 
product of individuals using the impartial spectator but a precondition for its application, since 
overall values and “moralities” are supposed to be something shared by all of society. In a context in 
which each has different sentiments, the impartial spectator would lead not to social desiderata but 
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only to the rationalization of individual value judgment. Smith aims at self-cultivation and, thereby, 
at the inculcation of common sentiments that enable virtue. 
Returning to the main line of this paper: Confucius and Smith share a great deal of 
philosophical anthropology and ethical thinking. While there is nuance between them in terms of 
the use of self-interest – how far does the interested self-use self-interest – and disagreement on the 
question of ritual and leadership, there is another factor that makes their respective philosophies as 
different as they seem: their context. Each philosopher was facing a completely different historical 
and institutional environment. Therefore, each had different goals. Master Kong was restoring order 
by looking back at periods of greatness. Smith was eradicating poverty and creating a good society 
by devising a novel social model. Master Kong’s past greatness was a society determined by rituals 
and roles. His ethical thinking was that it is not only sufficient to do the right thing, it is necessary to 
do them for the right reasons, the right reasons being virtues. Smith’s novel social model was based 
on free transactional interactions. In order for these to work, people would have to be committed to 
each other, establishing a relationship of trust. This can be done through nourishment of virtues, 
self-command, and the constant balance in the light of the social approval of one’s actions. So, the 
similar philosophical anthropology and ethics applied to different institutional realms result in 
different models for society. 
This paper analyzed similarities and differences in the social philosophy of Confucius and 
Adam Smith. While both share a disregard for petty people and esteem the noble person as the 
cornerstone of society, each does it differently. In particular, both have different – but not 
contradictory – definitions of what makes an exemplary person. They agree that virtues are pivotal 
for acting and that virtues (always) have a relational character. Yet most importantly, both agree that 
the acting self has interests and that self-interest is practically and epistemically important. They 
disagree in the precise way self-interest is involved in action. 
The Smithian “gentleman” acts on virtues, has the action, its motivation, and its results relative 
to the whole society in mind. This guarantees that he is not a “xiaoren”. But, on the other hand, self-
interest guides the “gentleman’s” application of virtue, lacking ritual propriety and the performance 
of a public task. Therefore, the “gentleman” might be “virtuous” but is no “junzi”. 
It is in reading Confucius and Adam Smith as virtue-ethicists that it becomes apparent that 
not only virtue matter for them – the interested self matters, too. 
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